Southern Baptist Theology in the Late Twentieth Century
Southwestern Journal of Theology
Volume 54, No. 2 – Spring 2012
Managing Editor: Malcolm B. Yarnell III
By William Hasker. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008. 228 pages. Softcover, $20.00.
William Hasker’s The Triumph of God over Evil offers readers a unique, highly accessible, lucid attempt at providing Christians a justification of evil in the world. Instead of trying to offer a theodicy for skeptics, Hasker wishes to provide a theodicy for those who already embrace the main tenets of Christian orthodoxy. But, as an open theist, Hasker’s spin on theodicy is driven in part by his willingness to jettison one key concept traditionally held by Christians—that God possesses exhaustive knowledge of the future.
Hasker demonstrates a keen awareness of the contemporary literature concerning the problem of evil, both in its logical forms, as well as evidential forms (which he discusses in chapter seven). Hasker begins by clarifying his intention, which is to provide a theodicy rather than a defense against the problem of evil. As such, he seeks to move beyond skeptical theistic defenses and free will defenses with his project. Hasker carefully distinguishes philosophical problems of evil from existential (or pastoral) problems of evil. He notes that the crisis of faith that often ensues from serious tragedy causes the deep search for a justification of evil while simultaneously (although perhaps unintentionally) stifling the search for truth.
Regarding the Holocaust, Hasker relays the quote attributed to Irving Greenberg, who said, “No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of the burning children” (22). Evils such as the Holocaust lead Hasker to discuss various post-Holocaust theodicies. He explains that some people employ statements such as Greenberg’s in an effort to undermine genuine attempts to refute atheistic arguments motivated by the problem of evil. Greenberg’s statement suggests that anyone who would dare venture a philosophical response to the problem of evil doesn’t adequately feel the moral seriousness of the issues. “The speaker thereby claims for him- or herself a moral seriousness which is supposedly lacking in the opponent” (23). Hasker acknowledges the seriousness of evil, especially evils such as the Holocaust, but he insists (rightly) that attempting to provide a philosophical theodicy does not entail the conflation of the existential problem of evil with the logical/evidential problem of evil. That is, there is a place for weeping with those who weep (cf. C.S. Lewis, A Grief Observed) and expounding the difficulties of Christian theology in the face of philosophical problems of evil (cf. C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain) (22).
Describing John Roth’s theology of protest (31–41), Hasker writes, “In many respects it [Roth’s theodicy] is surprisingly traditional and orthodox” (35). But orthodoxy is not something that comes in degrees. Even if Arius walked the straight and narrow concerning other matters of doctrine, his heretical Christology was enough to earn him the label “heterodox”. A theological system either is, or is not, orthodox. Roth’s insistence that the Holocaust demands that “human repentance will have to be matched by God’s” entails an outright denial of divine holiness. Surely this is enough to label such a position heterodox. In all fairness, Hasker ultimately rejects this position, but I find it surprising that he could find anything even remotely Christian about a theodicy which cites approvingly of David Blumenthal, a Jewish theologian of protest, who “crafts prayers in which, after repenting of their sins, the congregation asks God to repent of his sins.” Continuing on to discuss the theodicy of D.Z. Phillips, Hasker agrees that justifications for evil relying on soul-making theodicies fail, for it won’t do to have the Good Samaritan saying, “Thank you, God, for another opportunity to be responsible” when coming across a victim of robbers (48).
The book continues with stimulating discussions about the Plantinga-Mackie exchange and the success of Plantinga’s freewill defense against the logical problem of evil (55–69). Hasker goes on to reject the so-called “best of all possible worlds” theodicy first promulgated by Leibniz. Hasker bases his rejection of this thesis on contemporary arguments, and his interaction with this literature again displays his profound awareness of a vast amount of contemporary philosophy of religion. Nonetheless, even if attempts to defend the coherence of such an idea prove successful, Hasker’s open theism prevents him from accepting the best of all possible worlds theodicy, for invariably free creatures play a creative role in determining which world God has actualized, and (given open theism) God could not know those decisions in advance.
Chapter five introduces the meat of Hasker’s free will theodicy. He disagrees with both Henry Morris and William Dembski, who argue that natural evil is the result of human sin (103–09). Instead, Hasker maintains that natural evils are the result of certain structural features of our world, and those structural features contribute to the goodness of our world in such a way that this “goodness” outweighs the negatives brought about by natural evils.
In chapter six, Hasker sets out his arguments concerning the value of free will (154–56). He suggests that the evils that result from our possession of free will do not outweigh the benefits of having genuine freedom. Hasker takes it as obvious that it would be better to parent an autonomous child (even if not perfectly predictable) rather than a robot-like, perfectly controllable child because of the genuine joy that it would bring the parent even amidst some suffering and pain. By parallel reasoning, Hasker concludes that it is better for God to create a world with free agents rather than a world of robots.
But free will—which Hasker finds so valuable—isn’t the solution to the problem of evil. In fact, by Hasker’s admission, free will is the very cause of all the problems. If the analogy concerning parenthood holds, it must have been well within God’s ability to create a world without free will—thus a world in which there was no Holocaust. As both Roth and Phillips suggest, if the Holocaust was the result of God’s endowing us with the “gift” of significant freedom, then “bestowing free will on the creatures was simply too great a risk and should not have been done” (37). This is all the more true if God, despite his lack of knowledge of what would happen, possessed prior to creation at least the knowledge of what couldhappen (i.e., knowledge of all modalities, which is exactly the sort of knowledge Hasker and other open theists maintain God does have). Furthermore, Hasker’s parenthood analogy shows the value of free will for the parent, not the child. But the problem of evil is a problem for us—we are the victims of evil, even if we are also the perpetrators. Besides this oversight, as a parent, given the eschatological consequences of sin, I would absolutely prefer to create my children without free will, for such would guarantee that my children would be saved from the everlasting terrors of hell. So, while free will seems to provide an adequate defense against the logical problem of evil, much more is needed before we can conclude that free will provides an adequate theodicy.
Of course, it isn’t surprising that Hasker sees such value in free will, given that he is willing to deny divine foreknowledge in order to preserve it. When outlining the theology that informs his theodicy, he repeatedly qualifies open theism with the adjective “orthodox”, suggesting that mere assertion is enough to guarantee the outcome. Of course, if one is inclined to see openness theology as orthodox, perhaps one will be more inclined to see other compromises with traditional doctrines as not-so-problematic. In conclusion, I felt that Hasker’s open theism creates as many problems for a free will theodicy as it solves, but space precludes a more detailed accounting of the impact of open theism on theodicy, the doctrine of God, or Christian theology more generally. Nonetheless, in spite of those concerns, Hasker’s book is an important work that deserves that attention of not only professional philosopher/theologian, but also pastors who are likely to face open theism with increasing regularity as it continues to grow in popularity.
