The New Atheism
Southwestern Journal of Theology
Volume 54, No. 1 – Fall 2011
Managing Editor: Malcolm B. Yarnell III
By William E. Hull. Atlanta: Baptist History and Heritage Society, 2009.
In the heat of the Southern Baptist controversy some years ago, William E. Hull published his own brief assessment of the wrangle, which, as he described it, focused on the difference in how two contending factions in the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) “do church.” Though hardly a thorough analysis of the etiology of the conflict or a prognosis for the future, the insights garnered were often accurate and always stimulating. Those articles and his recent small monograph, Seminary In Crisis, demonstrate why Hull has always been my favorite liberal Southern Baptist commentator. While I sometimes think that Hull gets it wrong, he is always a thinker, attempting to make sense of the whole and seemingly never deliberately trying to mislead.
For example, in the preface of this slender but provocative volume, Hull assesses with candor most of the moderate (i.e., “liberal”) attempts to evaluate the SBC landscape. Hull observes,
Now that the SBC Controversy is largely settled except for antagonisms at state and local levels, with the warring factions either off the scene or settled in new routines, it is time for moderates to begin investigating why they lost the denominational leadership that they had enjoyed for years. Some early accounts written in the pain of defeat were largely jeremiads against conservative perfidy, which may have provided therapy for the wounded but were ignored by conservatives who did not bother to read or respond. What we need now is neither finger-pointing nor breast-beating but a more rigorously self-critical look at how moderates discharged their leadership responsibilities in the thick of battle, not to blame but to understand why conservatives found it easier to win than they had ever imagined would be the case (ix).
In one prescient sentence Hull dismisses most of the moderate historiographical kitsch and pleads for rigorous analysis. Taking a sliver of the pie, Hull examines the responses of two successive presidents at Southern Seminary to the Conservative Renaissance in the Southern Baptist Convention as it impacted the life of Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Louisville, Kentucky.
The “protagonists,” as Hull describes them, are Duke K. McCall and Roy L. Honeycutt. McCall, who served as president at Southern from 1981to 1993, was at one time arguably the most powerful single figure in the SBC. He served as president of two seminaries and had a stint as the Executive Director of the Executive Committee of the SBC. He was a theological pragmatist, a politician, and a sometimes ruthless competitor. Now in his nineties, he was able to read and essentially approve Hull’s manuscript. Honeycutt (1926–2004) was a professor with a life lived largely in the academy, a gentle spirit for the most part. Hull’s thesis is that their personalities, as well as their personal histories, influenced and maybe even determined their opposite responses to the crisis they faced.
Hull introduces the issue at hand with a brief assessment of the origin of Southern Seminary. James P. Boyce is pictured as a classically educated elitist attempting to distill a modicum of learning in the “plainest” of ministers, placing these relatively untutored men side by side with those fortunate enough to have attended college. At this point Hull provides another motive for Boyce’s determination, one seldom admitted by moderates with less integrity than Hull.
Already, however, the challenge of the German model to confessional constraints had precipitated fierce conflict with the religious establishment on the Continent. To counter that reaction among his constituency in America, Boyce proposed that every professor subscribe to an agreed-upon declaration of doctrine that would assure the churches of the institution’s theological integrity (2).
Hull even admits that the tough sledding for the idea of a Southern Baptist seminary related to the constituency’s legitimate concern about one matter. “Finally, could a constituency already troubled by theological conflict be convinced that a faculty fully abreast of international scholarship would not compromise the most cherished convictions of the faith as some seminaries in the North had already begun to do?” (3).
The former provost at Southern concludes this introductory chapter with the observation that Southern has been a seminary wracked by controversy at regular intervals since its inception. He refers to the Toy controversy (1879), the Whitsitt controversy (1896–99), the Mullins controversy (1925–28), the McCall controversy (1958–59) and the “one that has dominated the last thirty years (1979–2009).” He does not mention that each of these, with only one exception, was a doctrinal controversy, and even that one had its doctrinal component. In a nutshell, Hull proves that the original concern of many in the convention was well taken.
Turning to the real point of the book, Hull evaluates not only the men, McCall and Honeycutt, but also their presidencies. Hull paints McCall as a seasoned veteran of denominational politics, who saw clearly and early the threat of the Conservative Renaissance. In response, McCall developed numerous lines of defense including clever intellectual ways of discussing the nature of the Bible while carefully avoiding specific and divisive words. As a final position, McCall intended to exercise an obscure clause in Southern Seminary’s governance documents that would enable existing trustees to refuse to seat the newly elected trustees sent by the SBC. Once again, gratitude must be offered to Hull for admitting the existence and intent of this plan, which, at the time, was vigorously denied by moderates.
McCall’s “one clear, simple strategy” to risk everything on this idea is in contrast to the diverse, almost experimental, responses that were characteristic of Honeycutt. Hull presents Honeycutt as the faculty scholar thrust into an unwanted role as president of the seminary. There is no mention in the book of the widely circulated rumor that Hull himself wanted the presidency, but he certainly did have his supporters. To Hull’s way of thinking, Honeycutt’s attempts “to cooperate”—culminating in his signing of the Glorieta Statement, in which the presidents of the six SBC seminaries affirmed to the inerrancy of Scripture, igniting strong reactions from faculties at Southern, Southeastern and Midwestern—were indecisive and naive.
Little is said by Hull about contemporary Southern Seminary. That would fall outside the purview of his work. Clearly, the present posture of Southern would not encompass Hull’s dream. But, there is recognition that the seminary has flourished under Al Mohler and the conservative board of trustees.
By way of summation, Hull’s assessment of presidents McCall and Honeycutt is precise, colorful, and helpful. His understanding of the life of Southern during these two eras is that of an insider who knew what transpired. On the other hand, there is ample reason to suspect that Hull misrepresents Boyce. His general thesis that Boyce would not have sided with SBC conservatives seems flawed based on the handling of the Crawford Toy incident alone. Reading the theology of Boyce and the perspectives of Al Mohler suggests that the former would most probably rejoice that the latter had restored the Boyce legacy. Whatever the case, if you are a history buff or a Southern Baptist, Hull’s style and insights must not be missed. If you are a conservative, enjoy a book from the opposition that tends toward objectivity and inadvertently establishes the rightness of the conservative cause.
