Jude
Southwestern Journal of Theology
Volume 58, No. 1 – Fall 2015
Managing Editor: W. Madison Grace II
Richard Swinburne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 242 pages. Paperback, $34.95.
Few debates receive as much attention in contemporary philosophy as the body/soul debate. Though the subtleties and categories vary, the two general sides are physicalism and dualism. The formidable Oxford philosopher, Richard Swinburne, enters the foray with Mind, Brain, and Free Will. This review will give short descriptions of Swinburne’s chapters and arguments and note one minor contention with an element of his argumentation.
As a dualist, Swinburne seeks to show that there are sound reasons for believing in the existence of a human soul. He writes that the focus of the book is “the nature of human beings—whether we are merely complicated machines, or souls interacting with bodies; and what follows from this for whether we have free will in a sense which makes us morally responsible for our actions” (1). Thus, according to Swinburne, our metaphysical stance regarding the human soul has substantial effect upon moral permissibility.
In chapter 1, “Ontology,” Swinburne starts laying the ground work for his metaphysics. Here he establishes a framework for proprieties, substances, and events that he uses throughout the remainder of his book. Swinburne, being the crafty wordsmith that he is, constructs his positions by establishing philosophical foundations that bolster future conclusions.
With chapter 2 Swinburne discusses his view of epistemic justification. In detailing his criteria for justified beliefs, Swinburne also argues that the principles of credulity and testimony are reliable sources of accepting beliefs as probably true. In chapters 3 and 4, Swinburne begins forming his basic view of the soul, claiming that a full history of the world must include both mental and physical events. It is here that he seeks to prove that there is a difference between mental and physical properties. The distinction is proposed in “terms of the privileged accessible/public” (67). In other words, Swinburne defines the distinction between mental and physical properties by measuring the accessibility of the experience that has been instantiated. If the experience is purely subjective then it is mental. If the experience can be shared equally then the property is physical. Using this foundation, in chapter 4, he addresses epiphenomenalism, the view that mental events—such as consciousness—exist, but have no causal power over physical events—the body. Swinburne argues that “no one could ever be justified in believing the core first principles of epiphenomenalism” (101); for one of the primary mental properties is intention, and intentions are a significant causation of physical events. Thus, most of chapter 4 is spent rebutting arguments defending epiphenomenalism.
Chapter 5 is an extension of Swinburne’s groundwork from chapters 3 and 4. Here Swinburne argues that it is the intentions of the agent that causes brain events which in turn cause bodily movements. It is the individual, he argues, that forms intentions which affects the brain. Thus, his primary focus is to defend agent causation over event causation.
In chapter 6, Swinburne details the nature of mental events. Defining mental events as “one for which the possession of some mental property is essential” (141), Swinburne discusses non-physical properties, the interactive problem, and the ontology of a human being. After arguing for the existence of a non-physical component of the human being, in chapters 7 and 8, Swinburne argues that free will and moral responsibility are tied intimately to mental properties.
There is little needed in way of critique of Mind, Brain, and Free Will. As usual, Swinburne displays his mastery of philosophical ideas. He sets out to prove that it is logically consistent to claim human beings have an immaterial substance, and in this reviewer’s opinion he succeeds. There is, however, one minor squabble I have with Swinburne’s argumentation. He gives Occam’s Razor (simplicity) far more weight than it deserves. He writes, “The simplest explanation of many of the bodily movements which we make is often in terms of intentions . . . , and, as the simplest explanation, such an explanation is therefore most probably the correct one” (89). To be fair, Swinburne is one of many philosophers (and scientists) that hold simplicity as a major criterion for philosophic explanations. Yet, the criterion seems highly problematic. What is it about simplicity that one should be compelled to claim it as a significant indicator of truth? For one, simplicity is subjective at best. What may be considered simple to person A is highly complex and dubious to person B (both individuals being of equal intelligence). Furthermore, there is a meta-criterion that needs to be established—what is to be considered “simple”? The general understanding of the Principle of Parsimony is that one should not multiply entities beyond what is necessary. Yet this definition does little to help the debate; both physicalists and dualists use simplicity as reasoning for their positions. Next, there is little reason to assume that simplicity is vindication for general acceptance of a theory or belief. Simplicity certainly does not make a proposition true. Lastly, accumulation of information comes in a gradation. What seems complex today may be categorized as simple tomorrow (keep in mind, “simple” does not mean “easy to understand”). Thus, it seems dubious to claim that better understanding of the concept will lead to general acceptance. Perhaps the concept becomes better understood, yet seems less likely the answer.
It seems best to use simplicity as a weak paradigm or perhaps an initiation point, but not as a standard criterion for acceptance of a philosophy. Due to simplicity’s eclectic use, if it is employed robustly, an argument may be caught in the philosophical wash. Fortunately, none of Swinburne’s major arguments hinge upon simplicity. Thus, the criterion of simplicity only has negligible affects of his overall argument.
