Apologetics
Southwestern Journal of Theology
Volume 60, No. 2 – Spring 2018
Managing Editor: W. Madison Grace II
By James M. Dubik. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016. 225 pages. Hardcover, $50.00.
Retired three-star general James M. Dubik complains that the jus in bello aspect of traditional just war theory—that aspect related to the morality of the conflict itself—fails to address adequately strategic-level concerns and responsibilities. Drawing upon examples from the American Civil War, WWII, and the more recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, Dubik convincingly demonstrates that strategic war-waging responsibilities of both political and military leaders have ethical components and concludes that jus in bello must address not only conduct in battle, but also in waging war. This gets to the heart of civil-military relations, which he examines next. Dubik argues that traditional just war theory, as represented in the writings of ethicist Michael Walzer, follows Samuel Huntington’s model with its sharp division between political responsibilities in deciding for war, and military responsibilities in prosecuting the war. He complains that the objective-control and principle-agent theories, modeled on control and/or obedience and which form the basis for Huntington’s model, ignore the nature of wartime strategy as a spirited dialog between unequal partners. A proper war-waging dialog takes time, energy, professionalism, openness, and compromise, and it must include performance–what Dubik calls “a performance-oriented, dialogue-execution regime” (129). He rightly concludes that such a dialog will protect against excesses, short-sightedness, unnecessary escalations, and other strategic ethical failures.
Although Dubik characterizes his argument as a corrective to traditional just war theory, it is better to view it as a criticism of the application of jus in bello within a Huntingtonian framework for civil-military relations and a call for military and political strategic leaders to consider the ethical implications of their wartime decisions. Much of the book is devoted to civil-military relations, specifically with a view to undermining the Huntington thesis and offering a variation on Eliot Cohen’s unequal dialog thesis (Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime [New York: Free Press, 2002]).
Unfortunately, Dubik never really engages the just war tradition, ancient or contemporary, and instead relies almost exclusively on Walzer, whose agreement with Huntington is probably more reflective of the time he wrote—following the Vietnam conflict—than of the just war tradition itself. In fact, many in the just war tradition have argued that strategic leaders must address jus in bello concerns, as they have tied them to those of jus ad bellum and jus post bellum (the justice of going to war and of actions following war, respectively). For example, Augustine argued that war-making is proper to political and military leaders and that death is proper to soldiers because of their inherent mortality. He concluded that the evils of war are found not in the deaths of soldiers, but in “love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such like” (Augustine, Contra Faustum 22.74–79; quoted in Henry Paolucci, ed. The Political Writings of St. Augustine [Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962], 164.). The attitudes that give rise to the need for good men to use military force in war are the real evil and thus, jus ad bellum concerns dictate the other aspects of just war theory. He also saw the justice of war as tied ultimately to the divine purpose for a better peace and believed this meant that mercy should be shown to the defeated foe. In this way, he also tied jus post bellum to jus ad bellum. That is, Augustine saw all three aspects of just war theory—jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum—as inextricably linked, and as therefore having tactical, operational, and strategic aspects and requirements. Likewise, Thomas Aquinas, the first theologian to put forth criteria for just war, noted that the just intentions of political leaders for peace must guide intentions of military leaders during battle. This suggests that strategy is not only a part of jus in bello in the tradition, but is primary (Summa Theologica 2.40).
In addition, Dubik undermines his argument against Walzer on more than one occasion. For example, he criticizes Walzer for claiming that generals “plan and organize campaigns” and “decide on strategy,” when those decisions are the result of a complex and ongoing civil-military dialog, but this is more a critique of Walzer’s view of the strategic decision-making process than of his failure to address strategic issues (22). Dubik admits as much when he agrees with Walzer’s claim that wartime policy can affect the conduct of war and, therefore, addresses jus in bello (23).
Similarly, Dubik acknowledges that traditional just war theory, in the notions of proportionality and appropriateness, recognizes the inherent value of soldiers’s lives because taking those lives requires justification (51–52). The underlying principle of that recognition already speaks to the moral imperative of senior leaders to reduce the cost of war (in terms of lives) through responsible planning and decision-making throughout wartime operations. Dubik admits that Walzer addresses both this issue and that of identifying war’s proper end, fighting beyond which constitutes an ethical violation, but he maintains that traditional just war theory does not address the jus in bello because it relegates these concerns to decisions made prior to hostilities, or jus ad bellum (53).
Here, then, the debate seems to be primarily about semantics and not ideas, for a robust conception of just war theory (even traditionally conceived) includes considerations at the strategic level throughout the entire process. It is hard to see how Walzer has not touched upon jus in bello in his reference to the ethical obligations for ceasing of hostilities. Such decisions can only be made during the combat phase; benchmarks and ends can be identified in planning, but the decision to cease fighting can only be made in the midst of hostilities, that is, in bello.
Despite these minor shortcomings (and they are minor), Dubik’s underlying concern—that the ongoing dialog between senior political and military leaders on waging war has clear ethical dimensions—is sound. His work can therefore serve as a helpful corrective, not to just war theory per se, but to the improper application and influence of Huntington’s theory to the prosecution of war and to how senior leaders think about their ethical responsibility in that prosecution. Since Huntington’s theory continues to enjoy support among many top military and political leaders, Dubik’s work will prove timely and valuable. Senior military and political leaders would do well to heed his call to think through the ethical implications of their strategy formulation. It could mean the difference between mission success and failure, and between life and death for U.S. service members.
