Discipleship
Southwestern Journal of Theology
Volume 50, No. 2 - Spring 2008
Managing Editor: Malcolm B. Yarnell III
By Larry Shelton. Tyrone, GA: Paternoster, 2006. 268 pages. Softcover, $24.99.
R. Larry Shelton, who serves as Richard B. Parker Professor of Wesleyan Theology at George Fox Evangelical Seminary, argues that the traditional models of the atonement cannot meet the existential needs of postmodern people. Shelton finds his ideal model of the atonement in “the covenant motif ” that presents the interpersonal relationship between “divine commitment and human obligation” (19). Sin is the violation or abandonment of human obligations such as obedience and faith. Animals were sacrificed to restore the abandoned obedience and faith of sinners toward God. Likewise, the ultimate purpose of the atonement in and through Christ was not to get rid of the penalty of sins but to transform sinners into faithful and obedient children of God.
In light of the interpersonal relationship between God and man in the context of covenant, the forensic (penal substitution and satisfaction), classic (recapitulation, ransom, and Christ the victor), and moral influ- ence views of the atonement all fall short of the biblical presentations of the death of Christ. In particular, Shelton says the penal substitution view seriously distorts the truth of the atonement, for it describes the relation- ship of Christ and sinners in terms of the impersonal mercenary transac- tion between the two parties. This view also diminishes the importance of on-going repentance and obedience. Therefore, many evangelicals have lost the sense of participation by faith in the atoning work of Christ. Shel- ton asserts that many advocates of penal substitutionary atonement fail to connect the atonement with the incarnation, resurrection, and ascension of Christ and often imply that penal substitution is the only theme of the atonement. Shelton’s critiques of the penal substitution view of the atone- ment need to be heard.
Notwithstanding Shelton’s constructive critiques of the penal substi- tution view, I note several areas of disagreement. First, Shelton’s denial of the transference of sins in the Old Testament sacrificial system and in the cross of Christ must be rejected. As Shelton argues, it is true that laying one’s hand(s) on the animal to be sacrificed represents the identification between the victim and the giver of that victim. Unlike Shelton’s argument, however, identification is not mutually exclusive to the transference of sins. Rather, identification and transference are complementary to each other. Without the real transference of value between a victim and a person offering that victim, there is no real identification between two parties.
Second, Shelton’s denial of propitiation as the appeasement to the divine wrath must be reconsidered. Unlike Dodd, Shelton admits that the wrath of God toward sin really appears, but will not consider God as the object of propitiation. Consequently, the death of Christ did not appease God’s anger toward sinners but simply got rid of the sins that caused the wrath of God. However, this view fails to recognize that God is not only the subject but also object of the propitiation.
Third, Shelton’s presentation of the penal substitution view is not fair. Shelton’s assertion is that the kernel of the penal substitution view is union with Christ. None of the responsible representatives of this view presents the forgiveness of sins and the declarative righteousness of a believer in a way of ex opera operato. The penal substitution view strongly emphasizes faith as the only means through which sinners can be identified with the crucified Christ.
In sum, Shelton is right to argue that the atonement is not merely the matter of changing the legal status of sinners before God but involves the restoration of the covenantal relationship between God and sinners. In addition, he correctly warns that penal substitution is not the only valid perspective of the atonement. Unfortunately, however, Shelton himself is in danger of holding to only a subjective theory that does not see God as judge or take his retributive justice into account. Is the restoration of the broken covenantal fellowship possible without establishing forensic justice? Abraham’s appeal to the justice of God must be echoed to contempo- rary opponents of penal substitution: “Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is just?” (Gen 18:25, KJV).
