The Reformation
Southwestern Journal of Theology
Volume 60, No. 1 – Fall 2017
Managing Editor: W. Madison Grace II
Conversion in Luke-Acts: Divine Action, Human Cognition, and the People of God. By Joel B. Green. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2015. 224 pages. Paperback, $25.00.
In this volume, Joel Green, a respected Lukan scholar, employs data from cognitive science to counter common presuppositions about conversion, allowing for a fresh synthesis of the Lukan motif of conversion. Green identifies the common interior understanding of conversion as a vestige of William James’ thought (6–10). He introduces cognitive sciences as a vantage from which to see past such false dichotomies about conversion as ideological or moral change, religious or personal change, divine or human agency, event or process (13–16).
Chapter two claims that the cognitive sciences can study those components of humanity that are able to experience God (19). The takeaway of the chapter is supposed to be that all human experience, even religious experience is embodied (38), and since Luke’s accounts assume embodied experiences, they allow for compatibility with neuroscience (32–37). However, the studies Green presents elicit questions about issues tangential to conversion (e.g., Has neuroscience eroded the idea of an immaterial aspect of humanity entirely?) that lie unaddressed. For a novice to neu-roscience, chapter two needs less data and more clear connections to Lukan studies.
Chapters three, four, and five occupy themselves with Luke-Acts. Green argues that Luke left no clear pattern for conversion (49), nor can key terms encapsulate the Lukan motif. Moreover, the theoretical distinction between repentance and conversion is not supported by either neuroscience, where neuronal changes would be similar, or by Luke-Acts, where Jew and Gentile are both expected to repent (49–53). Luke 3 is “the first extended discussion of repentance or conversion” (49), where John the Baptist calls for embodied, ongoing orientation toward God (62–63). Green chooses the cognitive metaphor “life is a journey” as the best fit for Lukan portrayal of conversion because both Luke 1:16–17 and 3:3–6 use journey metaphors, both texts describe repentance/conversion, and thus conversion is vitally linked to journey (64–65). The metaphor conveys good doctrine even if the Lukan textual support Green adduces does not unequivocally support “conversion is a journey” (e.g., 68–69, 99–105).
Overall, Green shines when drawing implications about conversion from texts (e.g., 105–19, 124–32, 143–58). Students of Scripture should appreciate how the author interprets Luke-Acts, and parts of the book would supplement a class on evangelism. Less satisfying is Green’s case for summarizing conversion as a journey in Luke-Acts. For example, “the eschatological coming of God to restore Israel” (88) is an apt phrase for the use of Isaiah 40 in Luke 3, but Green understands the whole section to picture conversion/repentance (65–68). Another example: the delayed giving of the Holy Spirit in Samaria (Acts 8) is more likely about the unifying testimony of the apostles (as Acts 1:1–8 anticipated) than about the ongoing conversion of Peter and John (154; one wonders why not all the apostles?).
